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The most vexing problem facing Congress as it works toward completion of the farm 
bill is where to fi nd funding to make 
changes in farm legislation. High 
commodity prices have drastically 
reduced available funds that sup-
porters of change can tap to create 
new programs or expand existing 
programs. The agricultural commit-
tees have found only two signifi cant 
sources of funds under their con-
trol: direct payments and the crop 
insurance program. Reductions in 
either program could fund increased 
nutrition and conservation pro-
grams or could be used to redesign 
commodity programs. The rationale 
for cutting direct payments is that it 
is diffi cult to see why crop farmers 
should receive subsidy payments 
when farm income is at record lev-
els. The rationale for cutting crop 
insurance subsidies is that taxpayer 
support for the program has bal-
looned with the higher commodity 
prices, far outstripping the costs of 
actually running the program. 
The House-passed farm bill 
kept direct payments in place but 
reduced crop insurance funding. 
About half of the House cuts to crop 
insurance are real and about half 
are budget sleights of hand that 
involve moving payments from one 
fi scal year to the next. At press time, 
the Senate had yet to act on a farm 
bill but indications are that the Sen-
ate will also choose to reduce crop 
insurance funding. The fi nal farm 
bill will be written by a conference 
committee and the choice for the 
conference committee will be the 
same: if changes are to be made in 
the farm bill, the only two places to 
fund such changes are reductions in 
direct payments or funding reduc-
tions to crop insurance.
How to Save Billions in Farm Spending 
One justifi cation for cutting crop 
insurance to help fund commodity 
program reform is that most crop 
insurance subsidies are targeted at 
the same crops that receive farm 
program payments. Table 1 shows 
a breakdown in crop insurance pro-
gram costs attributable to program 
crops from 2005 to 2007. (The 2007 
payments are estimated.) Program 
crops account for more than 80 per-
cent of the costs of the crop insur-
ance program, and this share has 
increased signifi cantly over the last 
three years. More than $5 billion is 
now being spent on providing crop 
insurance to program crop produc-
ers, an amount that is about equal 
to the annual direct payments that 
the same producers receive. 
Figure 1 shows the share of total 
crop insurance premium for pro-
gram crops accounted for by each 
crop. As is readily apparent from the 
Table 1. Crop insurance subsidies for program crops
Note: Program crops include barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, oats, peanuts, rice, 
soybeans, and wheat.
aEstimated assuming that the 2007 aggregate loss ratio is 0.8.
Figure 1. Share of premium generated by each program crop
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data in Table 1 and Figure 1, when 
we talk about the crops affected by 
the crop insurance program, we are 
really talking about one large crop—
corn—and three other crops—soy-
beans, wheat, and cotton. 
The Table 1 data illustrates that 
signifi cant funds could be obtained 
from the crop insurance program, 
either through cuts in premium sub-
sidies, underwriting gains, or A&O 
(administrative and operating) reim-
bursements. Defenders of the pro-
gram, however, argue that it would 
be counterproductive to cut any of 
these three items. They say premium 
subsidies are needed to get farmers 
to buy insurance, and company profi t 
levels generated by taxpayer-subsi-
dized underwriting gains and A&O 
are in line with what commercial 
insurance providers generate from 
the private market. (See, for example, 
testimony from Ron Brichler, senior 
vice president of Great American 
Insurance Company, before the 
General Farm Commodities and Risk 
Management Subcommittee, House 
Committee on Agriculture, June 7, 
2007.) It follows, then, that any cuts 
from these levels would reduce pro-
gram participation by both farmers 
and private companies.
Understanding the implications 
of cuts in direct payments is simple 
because they are so transparent. 
However, the crop insurance pro-
gram is so complicated that few 
actually understand how the pro-
gram works and what would happen 
if program funding were cut. But 
by taking a closer look at the pro-
gram, we can estimate what could 
be saved and with what impacts. 
First, let’s look at producer premium 
subsidies.
Impacts of Reducing Producer  
Premium Subsidies
Farmers will choose to buy crop 
insurance if the benefi ts they derive 
from it are greater than its price. 
The fi rst benefi t is the standard 
insurance benefi t obtained from 
knowledge that crop losses in ex-
cess of the insurance deductible will 
be covered. Experience has shown 
that this insurance benefi t alone 
is insuffi cient motivation for most 
farmers to buy crop insurance. It 
must be, then, that crop insurance 
is a cost ineffective way for farmers 
to protect themselves against crop 
losses. Thus, to boost participa-
tion, Congress increased premium 
subsidies to the point at which most 
farmers fi nd it diffi cult to resist. But 
even with taxpayers paying more 
than half their premium, many farm-
ers claim that the program still does 
not generate enough payments rela-
tive to what they are asked to pay. 
Figure 2 shows the “break-even” 
percent subsidy for farmers in major 
corn- and wheat-producing states. 
Presented are the levels of premium 
subsidy that if applied to recent 
premium rates would equate farm-
er-paid premiums with expected 
indemnity payments for producers 
of corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, and 
grain sorghum in each state. Expect-
ed indemnity payments are calcu-
lated for two periods: 1980 to 2005 
and 1995 to 2005. The longer period 
is more indicative of expected in-
demnities if patterns of crop losses 
in the 1980s and early 1990s are pos-
sible in the future.
The break-even premium sub-
sidy for Iowa is 38 percent if future 
crop losses follow the 1980 to 2005 
pattern or 53 percent if the more re-
cent past is indicative of future loss-
es. This means that Iowa farmers 
have no profi t motivation for buying 
crop insurance until the premium 
subsidy gets substantial. The same 
result holds for Illinois, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, and Indiana. The nega-
tive break-even premium subsidies 
in Ohio, Kansas, and the Dakotas 
indicate that farmers in these states 
do not need a premium subsidy to 
break even because their premium 
rates are already low enough. 
The Figure 2 data indicate that 
Corn Belt farmers would not buy 
crop insurance if it were not heav-
ily subsidized whereas farmers in 
important wheat states would have 
a profi t motive to buy crop insur-
ance even without premium subsi-
dizes. Given that corn and soybeans 
together represent about 60 percent 
of the entire crop insurance pro-
gram, it is only a bit of an overstate-
ment to say that the crop insurance 
industry is selling a product with 
so little demand at its current price 
that without government price 
subsidies, there would be no viable 
market. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that unlike private 
insurance products, crop insurance 
Figure 2. Premium subsidy required for program crop farmers to break 
even on crop insurance
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premiums do not cover the cost of 
selling, servicing, and reinsuring 
the insurance policies. Instead, the 
government provides direct support 
to insurance providers through A&O 
reimbursements and reinsurance. If 
premiums were set to cover these 
costs, the break-even premium 
subsidies in Figure 2 would be much 
greater.
This lack of market for unsub-
sidized crop insurance means that 
substantial savings could accrue 
from a reduction in premium sub-
sidies. Direct savings would come 
about because farmers would be 
asked to pay more for their insur-
ance. However, the indirect savings 
from a reduction in premium subsi-
dies would likely be much greater 
than the direct savings. Depending 
on how the cut in premium subsi-
dies was implemented, it is likely 
that farmers would buy less insur-
ance. This decision would reduce 
their premium, which would reduce 
the per-acre premium subsidy and 
automatically trigger reductions 
in A&O reimbursements and un-
derwriting gains. Of course, such a 
move would reverse the policy of 
trying to maximize participation in 
the program. The House chose to re-
duce premium subsidies but only for 
a subset of crop insurance policies 
(GRIP and GRP). This choice limits 
the indirect savings, as many farm-
ers will simply move to products 
that receive higher subsidies. 
Growth in Administrative and  
Operating Reimbursements
The best measure of changes in the 
actual cost of selling and servicing 
crop insurance policies is changes 
in the number of policies sold. 
Although larger farms will tend 
to involve a bit more work than 
smaller farms, most of the cost is 
determined by the number of poli-
cies. Table 2 provides data that give 
insight into A&O reimbursements 
from 2005 to 2007.
Using 2005 as a base year as-
sumes that company reimburse-
ments in that year were enough to 
allow an adequate level of service to 
be provided to producers of pro-
gram crops. As shown, the number 
of policies sold to producers of 
program crops has fallen since 2005, 
yet, as shown in Table 2, total A&O 
reimbursements have dramatically 
increased over this period. 
To put this growth into context, 
the House farm bill would reduce 
A&O reimbursements by about 14.5 
percent. However, to hold A&O reim-
bursements per policy constant at 
their 2005 levels for program crops 
would require a 40 percent reduction 
in A&O reimbursements. An alterna-
tive way to provide A&O reimburse-
ments would be to base them on pol-
icy count rather than as a percentage 
of premiums. This change would cre-
ate an equal incentive for companies 
and agents to sell crop insurance to 
small and large farmers and it would 
not result in dramatic year-to-year 
changes in taxpayer costs that bear 
no refl ection to actual industry costs. 
A reduction in A&O would be felt 
most directly in a reduction in crop 
insurance agent commissions. If per-
policy A&O reimbursements were 
reduced to 2005 levels, then agent 
commissions would also be reduced 
to 2005 levels. If these levels were 
adequate to sell and service policies 
in 2005, then they are likely adequate 
today. If not, then consolidation in 
the number of agents selling crop 
insurance would occur.
Reductions in Underwriting Gains
Another way that Congress could 
cut crop insurance program costs 
is through a reduction in net under-
writing gains, defi ned as the differ-
ence between premiums collected 
and indemnities paid after account-
ing for the subsidized reinsurance 
that is provided by USDA. The 
House farm bill cuts program costs 
by increasing the “net book quota 
share” from 5 percent to at least 12.5 
percent. This quota share is the per-
centage of net underwriting gains 
that companies must pay to USDA 
when their gains are positive and 
it is the percentage of losses that 
the companies do not have to cover 
when net gains are negative. 
An increase in this quota share 
would be cost neutral if the prob-
ability and average magnitude of 
a loss equals the probability and 
average magnitude of a gain. But, as 
shown in Figure 2, premiums exceed 
expected indemnities in the Corn 
Belt. And because most of the crop 
insurance program consists of Corn 
Belt business, the probability of a 
gain is larger than the probability of 
a loss. Furthermore, the reinsurance 
provided by USDA treats losses dif-
ferently than gains. 
A good way to gain insight into 
the effects of an increase in quota 
share is by looking at the “value-at-
risk” curve facing the crop insur-
ance industry. Value-at-risk curves 
show the probability that underwrit-
Table 2. Growth in operating costs and reimbursements since 2005 for 
program crops
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ing gains will be less than a given 
level. Figure 3 shows the value-at-
risk curve with and without reinsur-
ance for the crop insurance industry 
from insuring program crops with 
premiums set at 2007 levels. The 
1980 to 2005 level of risk is embod-
ied in these curves. The risk would 
be much less than that shown if the 
1995 to 2005 level of risk were used.
Providing crop insurance to 
farmers is risky business. With-
out reinsurance, there is a 1-in-200 
chance that losses will exceed $8 
billion. The reinsurance provided 
by USDA reduces the 1-in-200 loss to 
$2.8 billion with a maximum pos-
sible loss of $3.6 billion. This loss 
was calculated by assuming that 
companies place all their program 
crop business in the riskiest/high-
est-profi t reinsurance fund and 
that USDA reinsurance is based on 
industry losses rather than indi-
vidual company losses. The reinsur-
ance also reduces the probability 
of a loss from 39 to 30 percent. This 
means that in 7 years out of 10, crop 
insurance companies should expect 
to have positive underwriting gains, 
which means that an increase in 
quota share will reduce program 
costs 70 percent of the time while 
increasing costs only 30 percent of 
the time. This asymmetry between 
gains and losses explains why in-
creasing the net book quota share 
will reduce taxpayer costs of the 
program. Every 5 percent increase 
in quota share reduces program 
costs by about $27 million. 
Where to Cut?
Congress has the opportunity to 
offset increased farm bill program 
costs by targeting cuts to crop 
insurance, which has generated 
tremendous growth in program 
costs. Signifi cant savings are avail-
able through reductions in premium 
subsidies, A&O reimbursements, 
and net underwriting gains. Reduc-
tions in premium subsidies would 
likely generate the greatest sav-
ings because farmers would likely 
respond by dramatically reducing 
the amount of insurance they buy, 
which would automatically reduce 
program costs. Because the growth 
in A&O reimbursements has far out-
paced actual increases in program 
operating delivery costs, signifi cant 
savings could also be realized by 
changing the way A&O is calculated. 
For example, capping per-policy 
A&O reimbursements at 2005 levels 
would generate annual savings of 
almost $450 million. And every 10 
percent reduction in the risk expo-
sure of crop insurance companies 
through expansion of the reinsur-
ance quota share could generate 
more than $50 million in savings 
up to a maximum annual savings of 
more than $500 million.
The choice available to Con-
gress is clear: the only two signifi -
cant sources of budget offsets to 
pay for the cost of changing direc-
tion with the 2007 farm are crop 
insurance and direct payments. If 
Congress chooses to cut crop insur-
ance and it does not want to reduce 
producers’ incentives to buy insur-
ance, then it will need to target A&O 
and underwriting gains. The impact 
of such reductions would be small 
initially because recent growth in 
both has been substantial. But com-
bined cuts in excess of perhaps $500 
million per year would likely begin 
to change the crop insurance deliv-
ery system, with fewer, larger crop 
insurance agencies. ◆
Figure 3. Value-at-risk curve for crop insurance companies with and 
without USDA reinsurance
